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VOLUME 98 NUMBER 6 2021  
 
STOP BLAMING MILTON FRIEDMAN! 
BRIAN R. CHEFFINS* 
ABSTRACT 
A 1970 New York Times essay on corporate social responsibility by 
Milton Friedman is often said to have launched a shareholder-focused 
reorientation of managerial priorities in corporate America. The essay 
correspondingly is a primary target of a rapidly growing group of critics of 
the present shareholder-centric approach to corporate governance. This 
article argues that it is erroneous to blame (or credit) Milton Friedman for 
the rise of shareholder primacy in American corporations. In order for 
Friedman’s views to be as influential as has been assumed, his essay should 
have constituted a fundamental break from prevailing thinking that changed 
minds with some alacrity. In fact, what Friedman said on corporate purpose 
was largely familiar to readers in 1970 and his essay did little to change 
managerial priorities at that point in time. The shareholder-first mentality 
that would come to dominate in corporate America would only take hold in 
the mid-1980s. This occurred due to an unprecedented wave of hostile 
takeovers rather than anything Friedman said and was sustained by a 
dramatic shift in favor of incentive-laden executive pay. Correspondingly, 
the time has come to stop blaming him for America’s shareholder-oriented 
capitalism.  
 
* S.J. Berwin Professor of Corporate Law, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge. I would 
like to thank participants in The Public Corporation at a Crossroads Symposium for valuable feedback.  
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INTRODUCTION 
John Maynard Keynes, a pre-eminent twentieth century economist, 
observed “[t]he ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when 
they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is 
commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else.” 1  A 
“spectacularly influential” 2  1970 New York Times essay by Milton 
Friedman, another distinguished economist, seemingly provides convincing 
proof of Keynes’ adage. In an article the New York Times entitled “The 
Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits,” Friedman 
harshly criticized those in the business community who maintained that 
private enterprises had a mission to promote desirable social ends.3 What 
the Times labelled a “Friedman doctrine” 4  reputedly would become “a 
seminal turning point in corporate legal theory.”5 In particular, Friedman’s 
essay has been credited with—or blamed for—launching a still ongoing era 
 
1. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY 
383 (1936).  
2. Glenn Feldman, Putting Uncle Milton to Bed: Reexamining Milton Friedman’s Essay on the 
Social Responsibility of Business, 32 LAB. STUD. J. 125, 125 (2007). 
3. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32. 
4. Id. 
5. Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas of Modern 












of “shareholder primacy” where corporate executives have assumed their 
job is to maximize shareholder value.6 
A “Great Debate” about whether public companies exist to deliver 
returns for shareholders or in service of a broader constituency has been 
underway for decades. 7  The question “in whose interests should the 
corporation be run?” and its close corollary “what should [a corporation’s] 
managers . . . strive to achieve?” have duly sparked debate in several 
academic disciplines, including law, economics, political science, and 
management.8 The general consensus in corporate America since the late 
twentieth century has been that shareholders are top of the managerial 
priority list. 9  The shareholder-first orientation has generated serious 
misgivings, however.10 Critics of the status quo maintain that managers 
should forsake their single-minded focus on stockholders so that the 
corporate sector can operate in accordance with a sustainable model that 
creates a bigger pie over time as business is conducted in a financially, 
environmentally, and socially responsible manner.11  
Milton Friedman has been a star player in this “Great Debate” over 
corporate purpose. His 1970 essay has been described as “the classic 
statement” of the shareholder oriented view of the corporation12 that set a 
standard destined to be widely followed.13 Shareholder primacy nay-sayers 
have accordingly bemoaned the essay’s malign impact and sought “to drag 
 
6. For recent examples of sources advancing this proposition, see Sam Hill, Opinion, The 
Nation’s Most Powerful CEOs Declared the Shareholder-or-Bust Era of Capitalism Is Over. But Is It?, 
NEWSWEEK (Aug. 23, 2019), https://www.newsweek.com/business-roundtable-corporation-purpose-fri 
edman-doctrine-1455975 [https://perma.cc/AF73-KQHZ]; Karen Ho, In the Name of Shareholder 
Value: Origin Myths of Corporations and Their Ongoing Implications, 43 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 609, 621 
(2020); Colin Mayer, Leo E. Strine Jr. & Jaap Winter, Commentary, 50 Years Later, Milton Friedman's 
Shareholder Doctrine Is Dead, FORTUNE (Sept. 13, 2020), https://fortune.com/2020/09/13/milton-fried 
man-anniversary-business-purpose/ [https://perma.cc/U98D-77HL]. 
7. Lynn A. Stout, New Thinking on “Shareholder Primacy,” 2 ACCT. ECON. & L., no. 2, 2012, 
at 1, 2–4; see also Chen & Hanson, supra note 5, at 33–37; Antony Page, Has Corporate Law Failed? 
Addressing Proposals for Reform, 107 MICH. L. REV. 979, 979 (2009) (“longstanding question”). 
8. Thomas M. Jones & Will Felps, Shareholder Wealth Maximization and Social Welfare: A 
Utilitarian Critique, 23 BUS. ETHICS Q. 207, 213 (2013). 
9. Judd F. Sneirson, The History of Shareholder Primacy, from Adam Smith Through the Rise 
of Financialism, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND 
SUSTAINABILITY 73, 74–77, 83–84 (Beate Sjåfjell & Christopher M. Bruner eds., 2019); Tamara 
Belinfanti & Lynn Stout, Contested Visions: The Value of Systems Theory for Corporate Law, 166 U. 
PA. L. REV. 579, 589 (2018). 
10. Diane Denis, Corporate Governance and the Goal of the Firm: In Defense of Shareholder 
Wealth Maximization, 51 FIN. REV. 467, 478–79 (2016).  
11. Sneirson, supra note 9, at 84–85; Steven Pearlstein, When Shareholder Capitalism Came to 
Town, AM. PROSPECT, Mar./Apr. 2014, at 40, 46–47.  
12. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 
97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 564 (2003); Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring Ambivalence of Corporate 
Law, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1385, 1405 (2008).  
13. David Benoit, Move Over, Shareholders: Top CEOs Say Companies Have Obligations to 
Society, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 2019, at A1. 











down and bury Friedman.” 14  Critics have characterized Friedman’s 
“infamous 1970 polemic” 15  as an “intellectually incoherent” piece that 
conjured up “a magical world” and advanced “the world’s dumbest idea.”16 
Regrettably, the reasoning goes, Friedman’s “wild fantasy obtained 
widespread support as the new gospel of business.”17 “[O]ne of the most . . 
. economically destructive articles in history” 18  reputedly “has had a 
catastrophic impact upon US business,”19  “and the consequences of the 
mistaken thesis have been mounting environmental and social problems 
around the world.”20 As Oxford management theorist Colin Mayer has said 
of “the Friedman doctrine,” “[f]ew social science ideas are both so 
significant and misconceived as to threaten our existence.”21 
Opposition to the shareholder-centric vision of the corporation that has 
prevailed in corporate America has been growing recently. 22  This has 
meant, according to the Wall Street Journal, that “[t]he hottest debate in 
corporate America asks whether a public company exists for the enrichment 
of shareholders or in service of a broader constituency, including employees 
and customers.”23 Most notably, in 2019 the Business Roundtable, a trade 
association of chief executives of leading American corporations, issued a 
300-word “Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation” that stressed “a 
fundamental commitment to all of our stakeholders” and did not specifically 
mention “shareholders” until the second-to-last paragraph.24 
 
14. Terence Corcoran, In Defence of Milton Friedman, NAT’L POST, Jan. 19, 2019 (Financial 
Post), at 1. 
15. David Ciepley, How America’s Corporations Lost Their Public Purpose, and How It Might 
Be (Partially) Restored, 10 ACCT. ECON. & L., no. 3, 2020, at 1, 10.  
16. Steve Denning, The Origin Of “The World's Dumbest Idea”: Milton Friedman, FORBES 
(June 26, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2013/06/26/the-origin-of-the-worlds-dumb 
est-idea-milton-friedman/ (“magical world,” “world’s dumbest”) [https://perma.cc/Z6ML-C2P4 ]; Yves 
Smith, Why the “Maximize Shareholder Value” Theory Is Bogus, NAKED CAPITALISM (Feb. 3, 2017), h 
ttps://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2017/02/why-the-maximize-shareholder-value-theory-is-bogus.html 
[https://perma.cc/HSV7-HA6Z] (“intellectually incoherent”). 
17. Denning, supra note 16. 
18. Michael Olenick, Original Shareholder Value Article – Milton Friedman to GM: Build 
Clunky Cars, NAKED CAPITALISM (Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2017/08/original-
shareholder-value-article-milton-friedman-gm-build-clunky-cars.html [https://perma.cc/CGN4-HYFF].  
19. Thomas Clarke, The Contest on Corporate Purpose: Why Lynn Stout Was Right and Milton 
Friedman Was Wrong, 10 ACCT. ECON. & L., no. 3, 2020, at 1, 3.  
20. Colin Mayer, Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Jaap Winter, The Purpose of Business Is to Solve Problems 
of Society, Not to Cause Them, in MILTON FRIEDMAN 50 YEARS LATER 65, 65 (Luigi Zingales, Jana 
Kasperkevic & Asher Schechter eds., 2020) (ebook). 
21. COLIN MAYER, PROSPERITY: BETTER BUSINESS MAKES THE GREATER GOOD 2 (2018).  
22. BARNALI CHOUDHURY & MARTIN PETRIN, CORPORATE DUTIES TO THE PUBLIC 41 (2019). 
23. John D. Stoll, For CEOs, It’s a Whole New Job, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 2019, at R12. 
24. BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT ON THE PURPOSE OF A CORPORATION (2019), https://s 
ystem.businessroundtable.org/app/uploads/sites/5/2021/02/BRT-Statement-on-the-Purpose-of-a-Corpo 
ration-Feburary-2021-compressed.pdf [https://perma.cc/CUL9-YNXB]; Editorial, The ‘Stakeholder’ 












The Business Roundtable’s statement has been “interpreted as a schism 
between business and the Friedman Doctrine.”25 Similarly, it has been said 
that as unease with shareholder oriented capitalism has grown over the past 
decade “the challenges to Friedman’s model have been gathering 
momentum.”26 Indeed, finance professor Alex Edmans suggests that “[t]o 
declare that you reject the Friedman doctrine has become almost a 
requirement for acceptance into polite society.” 27  The New York Times 
joined the chorus when the fiftieth anniversary of the publication of 
Friedman’s essay rolled around in September 2020. As a Wall Street 
Journal columnist said shortly thereafter, “[a]lmost as penance for 
publishing the original, the Times recently printed an eight-page supplement 
nitpicking Friedman’s article.”28  
This all presumes that Milton Friedman deserves substantial blame (or 
credit) for the ascendance of shareholder value in public companies. He 
does not. While it is generally believed that intellectuals substantially affect 
legal and economic change, their influence tends to be taken for granted 
rather than being explained theoretically or proven empirically.29 Certainly 
in the case of Milton Friedman’s 1970 essay, its actual impact does not 
match up to the hype.  
Part of the reason the reality does not match up with the Friedman 
doctrine/shareholder primacy hype is that rhetorical flourishes deployed to 
describe his 1970 essay have set the bar very high. Economists Oliver Hart 
and Luigi Zingales have argued Friedman’s article can “be seen as 
providing the intellectual foundation for the ‘shareholder value’ 
revolution.”30 A Newsweek columnist suggested in 2019 that “for almost 50 
years, American CEOs have loosely followed what is known as the 
Friedman Doctrine.” 31  Harvard Business School professor emeritus 
 
25. Colin Mayer, Ownership, Agency and Trusteeship 1 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working 
Paper No. 488, 2020).  
26. Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson, Beyond the Bottom Line, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2019, Life & Arts, 
1; see also Luigi Zingales, Friedman’s Principle, 50 Years Later, in MILTON FRIEDMAN 50 YEARS 
LATER, supra note 20, at 1 (“Since the Great Financial Crisis, Friedman’s view has become increasingly 
unpopular.”). 
27. Alex Edmans, What Stakeholder Capitalism Can Learn from Milton Friedman, in MILTON 
FRIEDMAN 50 YEARS LATER, supra note 20, at 11, 12. 
28. Andy Kessler, Opinion, To Serve the Public, Seek Profits, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 2020, at A15. 
29. Fred S. McChesney, Intellectual Attitudes and Regulatory Change: An Empirical 
Investigation of Legal Scholarship in the Depression, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 211, 211 (1988); see also Rick 
Perlstein, Prophets of Instability, NATION, Mar. 30, 2020, at 27, 31 (saying about the author of a book 
dealing with mid-twentieth century American capitalism, “[i]n the manner of too many intellectuals, he 
privileges the role of intellectuals”). For an example of an attempt to assess empirically the impact of 
ideas on a sub-set of real world outcomes, see Camden Hutchison, Law and Economics Scholarship and 
Supreme Court Antitrust Jurisprudence, 1950–2010, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 145 (2017).  
30. Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market 
Value, 2 J.L. FIN. & ACCT. 247, 248 (2017).  
31. Hill, supra note 6. 











Malcolm Salter likewise maintains that with Friedman’s 1970 essay his 
“voice rang loud and clear throughout the business community and 
continues to resonate today in many classrooms and boardrooms.” 32 
Similarly, law professor Margaret Blair has suggested that “leaders of 
corporations” have been told for decades “that they should focus their 
attention solely on ‘maximizing shareholder value,’ as instructed by 
University of Chicago economist Milton Friedman.”33 It strains credulity 
that an entire school of academic thought could have this sort of impact, let 
alone a single newspaper essay that was not even 3,000 words in length. 
More prosaically, as this Article will show, the historical evidence does 
not tally with the hype. In particular, those who ascribe to Milton Friedman 
substantial responsibility for American companies prioritizing shareholder 
interests make a series of implicit erroneous assumptions about his essay 
and subsequent developments. For instance, while Friedman’s essay has 
been characterized as a standard-setter, whatever emphasis he placed on the 
bottom line was hardly novel. Instead, it was widely accepted at the time he 
wrote that generating profits was a core corporate mission. Moreover, for 
more than a dozen years after Friedman’s essay was published his reasoning 
did little to change managerial priorities. Present-day shareholder primacy 
only began to take hold in the mid-1980s when corporate America was in 
the grip of a wave of hostile takeovers. In addition, while Friedman did tell 
executives they should try “to make as much money as possible,”34 he failed 
to make any sort of plea that managers should obsess over earnings or share 
prices in the way they would subsequently.  
Friedman’s essay has been described as “one of the most influential op-
eds of the 20th century”35 and it may have been the most cited piece ever 
published in the New York Times.36 Friedman’s 1970 article no doubt was 
consequential.37  As this Article will show, however, the essay was not 
 
32. Malcom S. Salter, Rehabilitating Corporate Purpose: How the Evolution of Corporate 
Purpose Has Contributed to a Widening Breach Between Capitalism and Justice . . . and What to Do 
About It 22 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 104, 2019).  
33. Margaret Blair, Corporations Are Governance Mechanisms, Not Shareholder Toys, in 
MILTON FRIEDMAN 50 YEARS LATER, supra note 20, at 38–39; see also Gillian Tett, Capitalism – A 
New Dawn?, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2019, Life & Arts, 1 (arguing that Friedman’s 1970 essay “sparked a 
wider revolution,” including a political swing to the right that led to Ronald Reagan being elected 
president and Margaret Thatcher becoming Britain’s Prime Minister).  
34. Friedman, supra note 3, at 33.  
35. Luigi Zingales, Friedman’s Legacy: From Doctrine to Theorem, in MILTON FRIEDMAN 50 
YEARS LATER, supra note 20, at 128, 129.  
36. John Kay, The Concept of the Corporation, 61 BUS. HIST. 1129, 1132 (2019).  
37. This was certainly the case in the field of business ethics. See Colin Grant, Friedman 
Fallacies, 10 J. BUS. ETHICS 907, 907 (1991) (placing the essay at the pinnacle “in the canon of business 
ethics classics”); Sean McAleer, Friedman’s Stockholder Theory of Corporate Moral Responsibility, 7 












nearly as pivotal as those assigning blame for the supposed corruption of 
the priorities of corporate America have suggested. 
The Article is organized as follows. Part I canvasses the assumptions 
underpinning the contention that Milton Friedman’s 1970 essay was “a 
seminal turning point.” Part II places the 1970 essay in the context of the 
time that Friedman wrote it and in so doing casts doubt on the notion that 
his essay was a fundamental break from the past. Part III draws attention to 
the essay’s failure to change minds with any alacrity. Part IV explains why 
a shareholder primacy ethos ultimately took hold in America’s public 
companies, emphasizing in so doing a wave of hostile takeovers occurring 
in the 1980s and the deployment of a corporate governance agenda in the 
1990s that provided corporate executives with heretofore unprecedented 
financial incentives to prioritize share prices. Part V draws attention to the 
fact that the message that Friedman was seeking to convey in 1970 differed 
materially from an earnings focused “shareholder first” mentality that 
moved to the forefront as the twentieth century drew to a close. The 
Conclusion emphasizes that it is well past time for those debating corporate 
purposes to stop blaming Milton Friedman for the current fixation on 
shareholder value.  
I. FRIEDMAN’S ESSAY AS “SPECTACULARLY INFLUENTIAL”: KEY 
ASSUMPTIONS 
Milton Friedman’s 1970 New York Times essay reputedly was an 
important turning point in American corporate life, serving as the catalyst 
for the maximization of shareholder returns to emerge as the core value of 
public company executives. The chronology underlying the shift in 
priorities has been characterized by Harvard Business School professor 
Gautam Mukunda as follows: “Executives often explain their deference to 
Wall Street by saying they have a ‘fiduciary duty’ to maximize shareholder 
returns. That’s been an article of faith since 1970, when Milton Friedman 
wrote in the New York Times that executives' only responsibility was 
maximizing profits.” 38  The Financial Times has suggested similarly 
“[s]hareholder primacy took off in the 1970s, starting with a Milton 
Friedman essay in The New York Times in which the economist argued that 
it was inappropriate for boards to focus on anything other than maximising 
shareholder value.”39 It would seem to follow that, as law professor Antony 
 
38. Gautam Mukunda, The Price of Wall Street’s Power, HARV. BUS. REV., June 2014, 70, 72.  
39. Sujeet Indap, “Shareholder Primacy” and Workers’ Rights Are Back on the US Agenda, FIN. 
TIMES, Sept. 25, 2018, at 12; see also Allen Ferrell, Hao Liang & Luc Renneboog, Socially Responsible 
Firms, 122 J. FIN. ECON. 585, 586 (2016) (maintaining “[t]he opposite view” to corporate social 
 











Page has said, “Nobel Laureate Milton Friedman was perhaps the leading 
proponent of the shareholder-primacy model of corporate governance.”40 
Three key assumptions implicitly underpin the thesis Milton Friedman’s 
1970 essay had a decisive impact on corporate priorities. The first is that 
Friedman was advocating a stance at odds with the prevailing wisdom. His 
essay could only be a corporate purpose game-changer if the views he 
advanced amounted to a substantial break with the past. If, in contrast, 
Friedman’s take on the social responsibility of corporations was familiar to 
readers in 1970, he could hardly qualify as the pioneering shareholder value 
advocate he is said to have been. This indeed was the situation. The 
proposition that companies should focus on the bottom line rather than 
catering to constituencies such as labor, consumers, and the public at large 
was well known at the time Friedman wrote. 
The second assumption is that Friedman’s 1970 essay put the consensus 
view he was reputedly challenging under immediate threat.41 In order for 
Friedman’s stance to have constituted an “article of faith since 1970,”42 his 
views should have begun changing minds immediately. If in fact a strong 
shareholder orientation only gained momentum ten or twenty years after 
Friedman’s essay was published the essay could not have been decisive. It 
would instead be nothing more than an intellectual appetizer for a change in 
philosophy that would subsequently sweep America’s boardrooms. This in 
fact is what happened.  
The third key assumption is that Milton Friedman pressed for companies 
to seek to maximize shareholder returns in the manner that ultimately would 
become the prevailing ethos in corporate America. If his 1970 New York 
Times essay truly acted as the catalyst for a revolutionary change in 
managerial priorities, executives ultimately should have conducted 
themselves in a manner Friedman explicitly encouraged. On the other hand, 
if Friedman had something different in mind, it would follow that his 1970 
essay was at best an indirect forerunner of the shareholder-first mentality 
that come to prevail.  
 
responsibility began with Friedman’s 1970 essay); David J. Berger, In Search of Lost Time: What If 
Delaware Had Not Adopted Shareholder Primacy, in THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN CHANGING TIMES: 
IS THE LAW KEEPING UP? 48, 49 (Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall Thomas eds., 2019) (saying 
shareholder primacy’s “lineage is perhaps best traced in popular culture to Milton Friedman’s famous 
1970 article”).  
40. Page, supra note 7, at 979.  
41. See, e.g., Eduardo Porter, Motivating Corporations to Do Good, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2014, 
at B1 (“Friedman’s maxim arrived just in time for the era of the hostile takeover and the leveraged 
buyout, when corporate raiders sold themselves as saviors liberating shareholders from misguided 
managers who paid too little attention to the stock price.”). In fact hostile takeovers only began to move 
share prices to the top of the managerial agenda fifteen or so years after Friedman’s essay was published. 
See infra Part IV.B.  












Some have indeed identified substantial continuity between what 
Friedman advocated and the subsequent prioritization of shareholder 
returns. According to Malcom Salter, “Friedman argued that a manager’s 
primary duty is to maximize the value of shareholders’ capital.” 43 
Management theorists Joan Mileski and Carter Franklin have said of 
maximizing shareholder wealth, Friedman made “a clear and forceful case 
for this single purpose.”44 The New York Times argued similarly in 2019 that 
with respect to “the notion that the role of the corporation is to maximize 
profits at all costs” it “had held sway on Wall Street and in the boardroom 
for 50 years,” with Friedman being “the doctrine’s most revered figure.”45 
Venerable corporate lawyer Martin Lipton suggested likewise in 2020 the 
terms “‘[s]hareholder primacy’ and ‘Friedman doctrine’ became 
interchangeable.” 46  Continuity in this context, however, is illusory. 
Friedman said very little about managers being under an onus to boost 
profits and less about shareholder returns. Moreover, an obsession with 
earnings targets that became familiar as the twentieth century drew to a 
close was nowhere to be found in Friedman’s essay.  
With respect to the first two assumptions that underpin the notion that 
Friedman’s 1970 essay was a “seminal turning point,” the next two parts of 
the article consider these. Part II casts doubt on the idea that Friedman was 
offering a novel assault on prevailing wisdom in his essay. Part III questions 
the extent to which Friedman’s essay redirected debate by making the point 
that in the 1970s and early 1980s executives evinced little enthusiasm for 
shareholders. It was only in the mid-1980s that the prioritization of 
shareholder returns began to take hold in American boardrooms in the 
manner that is familiar today. Parts IV and V speak to the third assumption, 
indicating in so doing there was a substantial disconnect between 
Friedman’s 1970 essay and the ethos that came to prevail in American 
public companies as the twentieth century drew to a close.  
 
43. Salter, supra note 32, at 22.  
44. Joan P. Mileski & Carter L. Franklin, The Humanization of Corporations, 17 AM. J. MGMT., 
no. 3, 2017, at 29, 30. 
45. David Gelles & David Yaffe-Bellany, Feeling Heat, C.E.O.s Pledge New Priorities, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 19, 2019, at A1.  
46. Martin Lipton, Beyond Friedman’s Doctrine: The True Purpose of the Business Corporation, 
in MILTON FRIEDMAN 50 YEARS LATER, supra note 20, at 22; see also Ho, supra note 6, at 622 (“[T]he 
Friedman article . . . made shareholder value seem natural and self-evident.”); Indap, supra note 39 
(“Shareholder primacy took off in the 1970s, starting with a Milton Friedman essay in The New York 
Times . . . .”); George Cheney, Juliet Roper & Steve May, Overview, in THE DEBATE OVER CORPORATE 
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 3, at 6 (Steve May, George Cheney & Juliet Roper eds., 2007) (“His essay has 
been widely used to support the common business adage that one’s first duty is to increase shareholder 
value.”). 











II. A BREAK WITH THE PAST? 
Milton Friedman’s 1970 New York Times essay typically is portrayed as 
a seminal turning point in debates about corporate purpose. But a turning 
point from what? To contextualize his essay properly, it is necessary to have 
a sense of contemporary thought regarding managerial priorities. Doing so 
reveals that Friedman was not saying anything particularly radical when he 
suggested directors should focus on profits. Why, then, did Friedman write 
his essay? In the 1950s and 1960s executives were quite often thought of as 
corporate statesmen with a mission extending beyond profit creation. The 
true catalyst for the essay, however, was a fraught context in which business 
was operating as the 1970s got underway. To set the scene, it is instructive 
to consider what managerial priorities were in the immediately preceding 
decades.  
A. Managerial Priorities c. 1970 
Law professors Ronald Chen and Jon Hanson have suggested that when 
Milton Friedman turned his attention to “the extent to which corporate 
directors and corporate law should be concerned with anything beyond 
profit . . . his was a lone [public] voice.”47 Financial journalist Justin Fox 
maintains similarly that Friedman’s “shocking arguments . . . scandalized 
liberal readers of the New York Times.”48 It is true that during the 1950s and 
1960s, a prevailing image of public company leadership was that executives 
were exercising corporate power in a self-restrained and socially 
responsible manner.49 Nevertheless, the notion that corporations were, and 
should be, profit-seeking was a thoroughly familiar one. Friedman thus was 
covering ground well-known to his readers.50 
For America’s leading companies, the 1950s and 1960s constituted the 
heyday of what is known as “managerial capitalism.” 51  With share 
ownership in most large firms having become widely dispersed during the 
first half of the century, responsibility for running America’s biggest firms 
had devolved to full-time salaried executives who had substantial 
managerial discretion due to neither boards nor shareholders providing 
 
47. Chen & Hanson, supra note 5, at 90. 
48. JUSTIN FOX, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL MARKET: A HISTORY OF RISK, REWARD, AND 
DELUSION ON WALL STREET 160, 273 (2011). 
49. BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, THE PUBLIC COMPANY TRANSFORMED 64 (2018). 
50. Cf. Tibor R. Machan, Stakeholder vs. Shareholder Debate: Some Skeptical Reflections, 9 
CONTEMP. READINGS L. & SOC. JUST. 7, 10–11 (2017) (saying that Friedman’s argument that managers 
should try to make their companies profitable was “[h]ardly a revelation” but suggesting that a strong 
moralizing tone Friedman adopted was novel).  












close oversight.52  Those public company executives, it seems, were not 
seeking ruthlessly to maximize profits. Instead, business leaders were akin 
to stewards for the enterprises they ran, operating their firms not only to 
deliver returns to shareholders but also to benefit constituencies such as 
labor, consumers, and the public at large.53  
Various observers have characterized the heyday of managerial 
capitalism in a manner that suggests Friedman’s take on corporate social 
responsibility was a radical departure from the prevailing view when he 
wrote. Law professors William Bratton and Michael Wachter maintain that 
the managerial capitalism era corporate executive functioned as “a ‘non 
statist civil servant’. . . subject to the consent of the governed. Social 
responsibilities followed.” 54  Management professor Gerald Davis has 
suggested that by the 1950s “[s]hareholders had completed the descent into 
irrelevance.” 55  Historian Steve Fraser has said stockholders “took a 
backseat to the corporation’s livelier, more demanding constituencies and 
clients: employees (often unionized), customers, civic groups and 
government.”56 Jeffrey Pfeffer, another management professor, makes the 
same point more pithily, saying “[i]n the 1950s and 1960s, the stakeholder 
was king.”57 (The term “stakeholder” itself was not used with any regularity 
in the corporate context until the 1980s).58 
Friedman’s 1970 essay indeed would have been substantially out-of-step 
with the mainstream if shareholders and corporate profit-seeking were as 
inconsequential as the foregoing suggests. In fact, neither had been written 
out of the mid-twentieth century corporate executive playbook. Law 
professor Harwell Wells, despite acknowledging with respect to corporate 
social responsibility that “[f]ew businessmen failed to at least give a nod to 
the concept during the 1950s,” maintains there is “little evidence to support 
a claim that managers of large public corporations in the 1950s actually 
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governed their firms for the benefit of multiple constituencies or cared less 
about profits than their predecessors or successors.”59  This echoes what 
noted management theorist Peter Drucker said in 1954 regarding “The 
Responsibilities of Management,” namely that “[m]anagements in America 
are nothing if not ‘profit-conscious.’”60 
Assessments of corporate priorities advanced in the 1960s suggest 
neither profits nor shareholders were written off by public company 
executives during the remainder of managerial capitalism’s heyday. Instead, 
as law professor David Ruder wrote in 1965, it likely was “[t]he normal 
expectation that the corporation is operated for the purpose of making 
profit.”61  Political scientist Michael Reagan, having acknowledged “the 
emerging concept of the corporation as a social institution,” indicated in 
1963 “[p]rofit still remains the life-blood for the corporate institution’s 
survival and welfare.”62 Economist Shorey Peterson pointed out in 1965 
“managers live, move, and achieve their reputations in a business culture . . 
. of income statements and balance sheets, of stress on per-share earnings 
and earnings growth, of securities analysts scrutinizing company 
performance.”63 Joseph McGuire, a professor of business studies, similarly 
suggested “businessmen strive for the highest profits they can obtain within 
a societal framework,” meaning “constraints placed on their behavior by the 
environment.” 64  This formulation closely resembles an invocation by 
Friedman in his 1970 essay to executives “to make as much money as 
possible” because he offered the qualification this should be done “while 
conforming to their basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law 
and those embodied in ethical custom.”65 Friedman’s essay thus was not a 
radical break from mainstream thinking at the time he wrote it.  
To the extent that managerial capitalism era executives prioritized 
shareholders and profits, perceptions of the nature of corporate law nudged 
them in that direction. Peterson, in making his case that it was a 
“pronounced distortion” to equate shareholders “as coordinate with 
employees, customers, suppliers, and the public, and, even more, as a poor 
cousin among them” made the point partly by arguing “[m]en do not act 
generally in plain defiance of a well-established conception of what is 
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expected of them.”66 He said in this regard that “[m]anagement is obligated 
fundamentally to promote the welfare of the firm and its owners,” with the 
term “owners” meaning shareholders in this context.67 Similarly, Reagan, in 
explaining why “[t]he concept of social trusteeship” belied “the actual 
behavior of corporations,” noted that “[i]n law, the structure remains one of 
accountability to stockholders.”68  
Peterson and Reagan’s interpretation of the shareholder-oriented steer 
corporate law provided to corporate managers was widely shared. Business 
law professor Fredrick Kempin said of directors in 1959 that “they are 
guided by an underlying responsibility to serve the shareholders, 
presumably by maximizing profits.”69 Lawyer Mortimer Feuer, in his 1965 
Handbook for Corporate Directors, maintained “[p]rofit making is the 
primary objective of a corporate enterprise.” 70  J.A.C. Hetherington, a 
leading corporate law academic, wrote in 1969 “[t]he formal legal statement 
of the management's role is that it is obligated to run the enterprise for the 
benefit of the shareholders.”71 
Reagan, in seeking to explain the “accountability to stockholders” 
orientation, focused primarily on voting rights with which shareholders 
were vested, noting that “no mechanisms exist to give equivalent voice to 
other ‘clientele’ groups.”72 Peterson, for his part, said “[f]inal assertion by 
stockholders of their legal position is through the proxy contest or the 
derivative suit.” 73  The former occurs when an insurgent seeks to gain 
control of a company by putting before the shareholders a rival slate of 
directors to that the incumbent management team has proposed and the 
latter is a mechanism available to a corporation’s shareholders to bring a 
suit on behalf of the corporation.74  As for Kempin, he focused on the 
analysis of directors’ duties in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., an oft-cited 1919 
decision of the Michigan Supreme Court where Judge Ostrander said “[a] 
business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the benefit of 
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the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that 
end.”75 
While Kempin was writing forty years after Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. 
had been decided, he indicated that the statement of Judge Ostrander 
remained correct and maintained “the law is sufficiently clear to negate the 
necessity for citations.”76 This assertion might well be a surprise to those 
familiar with a famous debate between law professors Adolf Berle and E. 
Merrick Dodd regarding the purpose of the corporation.77 Dodd, mindful 
that the view that “those who manage our business corporations should 
concern themselves with the interests of employees, consumers, and the 
general public, as well as of the stockholders” was growing in popularity in 
business circles, suggested in a 1932 law review article responding to a 1931 
piece by Berle that with respect to the corporation the time had come to 
adjust laws regarding “considerations which may properly influence the 
conduct of those who direct its activities.” 78  In 1954, Berle conceded 
Dodd’s point. Berle acknowledged then that “[t]he greatest leaders in the 
corporate field . . . forcefully argue that corporations are always citizens of 
the community in which they operate.”79 He also noted that a majority of 
states had passed laws authorizing corporations to make contributions to 
philanthropy and education, a trend of which he would have been acutely 
aware because he had just lost an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court in a case 
brought challenging the constitutional validity of New Jersey’s law on 
point. 80  Berle correspondingly accepted that “[t]he argument has been 
settled . . . squarely in favor of Professor Dodd’s contention.”81  
Chen and Hanson, referencing Berle’s 1954 concession to Dodd’s 
argument in favor of extending by law the considerations corporate leaders 
should take into account, contend “Friedman . . . was writing when Dodd’s 
view of the corporation was at its apex and corporate managers and judges 
believed that social responsibility was an important corporate constraint, if 
not the sole end of corporations.”82 Kempin, however, could also rely on 
Dodd to corroborate a shareholder-centric characterization of directors’ 
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duties. Dodd acknowledged in a 1935 article that “[h]owever much some 
modern corporate executives may like to think of themselves as trustees of 
an institution rather than attorneys for the stockholders,” “[p]rofit-making 
for absentee owners must be the legal standard by which we measure their 
conduct until some other legal standard has been evolved.”83 Kempin cited 
this piece as authority for the proposition that “the trusteeship of directors . 
. . is not a duty towards outside groups such as labor, consumers, or the 
public at large.”84  
B. Why Did Friedman Revisit Corporate Purpose? 
For present purposes it does not matter whether during the 1960s the 
shareholder-oriented characterization of directors’ duties set down in Dodge 
v. Ford Motor Co. accurately stated the law. The key point instead is that in 
1970 Friedman was anything but “a lone [public] voice”85 in contending that 
corporate executives should focus their attention on increasing corporate 
profits. What motivated Friedman, then, to use a New York Times op-ed to 
chide executives who claimed “that business is not concerned ‘merely’ with 
profit but also with promoting desirable ‘social’ ends”?86 One consideration 
was that Friedman was very open to publicizing his views via popular media 
outlets—he wrote a regular column for Newsweek between 1966 and 1984 
and was interviewed by Playboy in 1973.87 However, with corporations and 
profits he had already set out his views in 1962 in his book Capitalism and 
Freedom, 88  which had “created a firestorm of conversation on many 
subjects.”89 He thus was already known by 1970 as a vocal proponent of the 
“traditional” view that the primary societal responsibility of corporate 
executives was to endeavor to make money for their firms.90  
Circumstances affecting American business as the 1970s began do much 
to explain why Friedman wrote his essay. Various commentators seeking to 
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address this point have misfired badly. Finance professor Raghuram Rajan 
has mysteriously argued “Friedman was reacting to the Johnson 
administration exhorting corporations to stop raising prices in an attempt to 
combat inflation.”91 Richard Nixon had in fact been president for nearly two 
years when Friedman penned his essay. Karthik Ramanna, an expert on 
management, has suggested that Friedman wrote the New York Times essay 
to implore corporate America to focus on the bottom line because Friedman 
believed complacency was leaving “American business vulnerable to 
international competition—Japan was resurgent and rapidly re-
industrializing.”92 Friedman, in fact, said nothing about Japan or any other 
foreign country in his essay and used the word “competition” only once, as 
part of a quote from his 1962 Capitalism and Freedom book.93  This is 
hardly surprising, given that in the 1960s “[m]ost Americans hardly seemed 
to notice” that Japanese and European exports were making significant 
inroads into global markets.94 
In fact, a charged political atmosphere characterized by growing 
antipathy toward American business likely prompted Friedman to write his 
essay. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, American labor 
productivity and living standards both improved substantially and the S&P 
500 stock market index rose more than 650% between January 1950 and 
December 1968.95 Sustained prosperity in turn bolstered the popularity of 
business.96 A 1966 Louis Harris poll found that 55% of respondents had “a 
great deal of confidence” in those running major companies.97 In a 1968 
survey conducted by Yankelovich, Skelly & White Inc. 70% of respondents 
indicated they believed that business tried to strike a fair balance between 
profits and the public interest.98 
Corporate executives abruptly had the rug pulled out from underneath 
them as the 1960s drew to a close and the 1970s began. The proportion of 
Americans with “a great deal of confidence” in major companies fell from 
55% in 1966 to 27% in 1971.99 Those who believed that business tried to 
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strike a fair balance between profits and the public interest declined from 
70% in 1968 to 33% in 1970.100  
A swooning stock market was one reason the popularity of business 
collapsed. The S&P 500 fell 31% between mid-December 1968 and mid-
June 1970.101 The fact large corporations found themselves in the cross-
hairs of considerable social ferment also put corporate executives on the 
back foot.102 Law professor Donald Schwartz said in a 1971 article about 
“Campaign GM,” which involved a public interest lobby group founded by 
consumer activist Ralph Nader demanding that General Motors put to a 
shareholder vote resolutions dealing with environmental, consumer, and 
race issues: 
The problems of the 1960’s produced bitter dissent; while the 
problems grew more serious, our national temper grew hotter. Anger 
and frustration over the prolonged war in Indochina and a gnawing 
malaise over our inability to solve increasingly complex problems at 
home characterized the national mood. Presidential commissions 
gave discouraging reports on racism and domestic violence. There 
were confrontations at the Pentagon, seizures and shutdowns of 
universities, and riots in the streets of Chicago as the backdrop for a 
national political convention. Corporations, along with our other 
institutions, were targets of dissenters.103 
Companies in turn were politically vulnerable. According to a 1973 
study of corporate power, “[D]uring the 1960’s . . . [e]nvironmentalists, civil 
rights leaders, and consumer advocates—all criticized corporate behaviour 
and sought new constraints upon it. As the 1970’s began, the relative 
political influence of corporate business was probably less than it had been 
since the dark years of the Great Depression . . . .”104  The challenging 
atmosphere in which business suddenly found itself operating does much to 
explain why Friedman returned to the topic of corporate purpose in 1970—
corporate social responsibility had clearly taken on much greater urgency 
as compared with 1962.105  For instance, while none of the shareholder 
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resolutions ultimately voted on at General Motors’ 1970 annual meeting 
came close to passing, Campaign GM was characterized at the time as “the 
decisive event in the politicalization of the corporation.”106 Correspondingly 
an essay on corporate purpose could not have been timelier. 
Given the context, it is tempting to surmise that Friedman wrote his essay 
specifically as a rejoinder to Campaign GM.107 The point has to be left open 
because he did not refer to shareholder meetings or General Motors in his 
1970 essay. Still, Friedman was clearly aware of the context. The New York 
Times drove home to readers the topicality of his essay by featuring together 
with it a brief synopsis of Campaign GM and photos of its key 
protagonists. 108  Friedman himself referred in his essay to “the present 
climate of opinion, with its widespread aversion to ‘capitalism,’ ‘profits,’ 
the ‘soulless corporation’ and so on.”109 He wanted to emphasize to the 
current generation of executives in this newly fraught context that invoking 
a rationale of “social responsibility” to characterize and defend decisions 
taken would “strengthen the already too prevalent view that the pursuit of 
profits is wicked and immoral and must be curbed and controlled by external 
forces.”110 
III. A TURNING POINT? 
In order for Milton Friedman’s 1970 New York Times article to be the 
game-changer many have claimed, the piece not only should have been 
challenging the received wisdom of the time but also should have influenced 
corporate priorities promptly. If shareholder primacy did not move to the 
forefront with some alacrity his essay could not be the game-changer that 
everyone assumes. Friedman’s essay instead could not have done more than 
sow an intellectual seed. 111  Other factors instead would have driven 
shareholder value to the top of the managerial priority list. Circling back to 
the 1970s, Friedman’s essay did not have the immediate impact often 
hypothesized. Far from it. His essay did capture attention. But few were 
won over. It was not until well into the 1980s that shareholders moved to 
the top of the corporate priority list.  
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Friedman’s New York Times essay supposedly “unleashed a flurry of 
discussion both in academic circles as well as in the business 
community.”112 Certainly, Friedman, by publishing his essay in the Times, 
would have reached many more readers than he did with his 1962 analysis 
of corporate social responsibility in Capitalism and Freedom.113 It has been 
suggested further that the “[e]vangelical Friedman preached to an 
appreciative choir.”114 Thornton Bradshaw, chief executive of oil company 
ARCO, was a member of that ostensible choir. He opened a 1971 essay on 
corporate social responsibility by saying “I cannot conceive of discussing 
this subject without bringing up the name of Milton Friedman” and 
concluded “I have one last rule and that is to obey Friedman's injunction to 
make a profit.”115  
While Friedman’s essay had its fans in the 1970s, enthusiasm was the 
exception to the rule. His argument that directors of companies should focus 
on corporate profitability was by no means unfamiliar at that point in 
time.116 Nevertheless, a consensus that executives should focus on a broader 
set of goals had begun to take shape.117 Such thinking was a good fit with 
the 1970s, an era when “the social and legal climate encouraged 
management to adopt a pluralistic view of their responsibility to the various 
corporate constituencies.”118 In this milieu, Freidman’s essay seemed “off-
the-wall”119 and “far out of the mainstream.” 120  
Friedman’s 1970 essay, as well as being out-of-step with a growing 
consensus regarding corporate purpose, apparently did little to swing 
opinion amongst contemporaries. A 1971 Wall Street Journal article on 
corporate social responsibility noted that “[f]ive or 10 years ago any 
businessman worth his salt would have” said “a corporation’s job” was “to 
make money for its owners (a.k.a. stockholders)” and acknowledged that 
Milton Friedman “still argues that the corporation’s responsibility is to 
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produce profits” but indicated “that answer is rapidly becoming an 
anachronism.” 121  In 1974 the New York Times remarked upon “the 
heightened sense of social responsibility that now characterizes many 
corporate managements.”122 In a 1975 study of “the megacorporation,” law 
professor Philip Blumberg argued “[m]aking money for shareholders . . . no 
longer receives respect as an adequate statement of business objectives” and 
referred to Friedman as part of an intellectual “rear guard.”123 
The pluralistic orientation that prevailed in corporate America in the 
1970s despite Friedman’s New York Times essay was sustained as the 1980s 
got underway. In 1981, the Business Roundtable issued a “Statement on 
Corporate Responsibility” that struck a stakeholder-friendly tone akin to its 
2019 statement on the same topic, saying “[m]ore than ever, managers are 
expected to serve the public interest as well as private profit” and indicating 
that while “[t]he shareholder must receive a good return other constituencies 
also must have the appropriate attention.”124  The chair of the Business 
Roundtable said in support of this stance in the New York Times “[t]he 
simple theory that management can get along by considering only the 
shareholder has been left behind in old economic dissertations.”125 Milton 
Friedman’s 1970 essay thus seems not to have offered any sort of turning 
point for America’s leading corporate executives.  
The Business Roundtable’s 1981 stance was in step with the times, at 
least for the moment. While Peter Drucker said in 1954 that corporate 
executives were profit-conscious, his take in 1980 was that “most 
businesses look upon shareholders as a constituency that has to be 
satisficed” with a minimum acceptable return.126 Based on interviews with 
numerous outside directors of public companies University of Chicago 
management professor Thomas Whisler endeavored in 1983 to set out for 
Wall Street Journal readers these directors’ views on boardroom 
responsibilities. He said that while the directors knew that “officially, we 
are here to act in the shareholders’ interests,” this rule was “a rhetorical 
convenience” and that “[a] more accurate statement is that we act to 
maximize the economic value of the firm.”127  
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An interview-based study of top executives at a dozen leading 
corporations by Harvard Business School professors Jay Lorsch and Gordon 
Donaldson, also published in 1983, indicated senior management thought 
the same way as directors. Lorsch and Donaldson acknowledged “[i]t is 
commonly believed that the primary goal of these corporate managers is the 
maximization of shareholder wealth.” 128  In fact, their respondents’ top 
priority was “the survival of the corporation in which they invested 
themselves psychologically and professionally.” 129  The authors also 
reported that “none of the executives was very concerned about the current 
market value of his company’s stock. . . . [W]hat really mattered was the 
long-term health of the company.”130  
For at least a decade following the publication of Friedman’s New York 
Times essay, his take on corporate social responsibility not only failed to 
provide a turning point, it seemed destined to remain a marginalized point 
of view. William Dill, Dean of New York University’s business school, 
suggested in a 1978 volume on Running the American Corporation “that 
troubled times lie ahead” and indicated that a manager seeking “to keep his 
business autonomous . . . must recognize he is a public man, serving public 
needs.”131 Edward Epstein, a professor at U.C. Berkeley’s business school, 
acknowledged the following year “that the legitimacy of corporate behavior 
in the United States has been increasingly evaluated by performance criteria 
that consider the total societal impact of the firm and not simply its ability 
to maximize profits” and added that “[t]here is little likelihood that public 
concern regarding the social responsibilities of the megacorporation will 
fade away in the forthcoming decade.” 132  As Forbes noted in 1986, 
however, “in business as in life, nothing stays the same.”133 Before the 
twentieth century drew to a close, managerial priorities would be strongly 
reoriented in favor of shareholders. The next two parts of the Article 
consider this transition, indicating in so doing that it had little to do with 
Milton Friedman’s 1970 prescription regarding corporate and managerial 
priorities.  
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IV. SHAREHOLDERS RISE TO THE TOP OF THE PRIORITY LIST: WHEN AND 
WHY 
The Business Roundtable, having declared in 1981 that managers were 
“expected to serve the public interest as well as private profit,”134 adopted a 
similarly neutral corporate purpose tone in 1990. According to a Business 
Roundtable statement on corporate governance, it was “the directors’ 
responsibility to carefully weigh the interests of all stakeholders as part of 
their responsibility to the corporation or to the long-term interests of its 
shareholders.”135 This balancing act was shelved in 1997. The Business 
Roundtable declared “the paramount duty of management and of boards of 
directors is to the corporation’s stockholders” and indicated “the interests 
of other stakeholders” were merely “relevant as a derivative of the duty to 
stockholders.”136  
As journalist Steve Pearlstein has observed, when the change of heart 
occurred in 1997 “the Business Roundtable was striking a tone that sounded 
a whole lot more like Professor Friedman.”137 Given, however, that the 
Business Roundtable’s conversion to shareholder primacy only took place 
nearly three decades after Friedman published his essay, his views self-
evidently had little direct influence on that conversion. The change also did 
not occur because of anything further that Friedman had to say on point. He 
elaborated on his views on corporate social responsibility in a 1972 
interview published in Business and Society Review.138 Otherwise, despite 
the frosty reception his 1970 essay elicited, he was “not rushed into print 
with rebuttals,” perhaps because he believed his vision “however imperfect 
. . . bristle[d] with potential.” 139  Moreover, as the “shareholder first” 
mentality took hold in corporate America, its tone would differ materially 
from Friedman’s. Part V canvasses this point. Here we consider when 
managerial priorities pivoted decisively in favor of shareholders and why.  
A. When?  
While the 1970s emphasis on balancing the interests of corporate 
constituencies continued to prevail in the early 1980s, prioritization of 
shareholders then began to gain momentum. Alfred Rappaport, a 
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“shareholder value” pioneer amongst academics who helped to popularize 
the phrase,140  noted in his 1986 book Creating Shareholder Value that 
“[e]ndorsements of the shareholder value approach can be found in an 
increasing number of annual reports and other corporate publications.”141 
1983 would be the first year that more than two American public 
corporations used the term “shareholder value” in their annual reports to 
shareholders.142 Within two years over fifty companies were doing so and 
by 1989 30% of publicly traded companies were deploying the phrase.143  
Business publications and the academic literature also reflected the 
growing attention shareholders were attracting. While the term “shareholder 
value” rarely appeared in the daily Wall Street Journal prior to 1980 and 
was only mentioned in 10 articles between 1980 and 1982, usage increased 
to 13 articles in 1983, 26 in 1984, 76 in 1985, and 113 in 1986.144 The 
pattern was replicated with the bi-monthly Harvard Business Review. The 
term “shareholder value” first appeared in 1955, was referred to again in 
1981, and then was mentioned nine times between 1986 and 1989.145 The 
momentum was similar for academic publications generally (Figure 1).146 
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Figure 1: Usage of the Term “Shareholder Value” in Academic 
Publications, 1969–89 
  
Source: JSTOR (all sources, search restricted to articles, reviews, and 
research papers) 
A managerial reorientation in favor of shareholders accompanied the 
change in nomenclature. In 1984 the New York Times drew attention to “a 
renewed emphasis on the most visible sign of corporate well-being—stock 
price.”147  A 1986 report by a congressional subcommittee on takeovers 
suggested that “[w]hile the corporate reformers of the 1970s urged that 
‘accountability’ meant being a good corporate citizen answerable to society 
as a whole, observers might now suggest that ‘accountability’ in the 1980s 
means keeping stock prices high for stockholders.”148 Winthrop Knowlton, 
a former CEO of publishers Harper & Row, and Ira Millstein, a prominent 
Wall Street lawyer and corporate governance expert, argued in 1988 that the 
American corporation was undergoing “a vast and necessary transition” at 
the core of which was “a heightened awareness of the need to serve 
shareholders better.”149  The Chicago Tribune‘s financial editor said the 
same year the shareholder was “king now.”150  
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Explanations proffered for the 1980s managerial reorientation in favor 
of shareholders have included growth in the percentage of shares owned by 
institutional shareholders that provided an improved foundation for 
shareholder activism and the emergence of agency cost theory as an 
influential shareholder-friendly school of thought in the corporate realm.151 
The real game-changer for public companies, however, was an 
unprecedented surge in hostile takeover bids.152 When the New York Times 
sought to explain in 1984 the “renewed emphasis” on share prices, it 
acknowledged that executives liked a high stock price because this “ma[de] 
it easier to issue new shares.”153 The Times stressed particularly, though, the 
“unsavory prospect” of an unwelcome takeover bid, noting that companies 
“among America’s mightiest” had lost or were in danger of losing their 
independence because of their “sin” of failing “to keep their stock price high 
enough to fend off attack.”154  
As far back as the 1950s there was awareness that the threat of an 
unwelcome takeover was a potentially significant disciplinary mechanism 
for public company executives.155 However, in the 1980s—known as the 
Deal Decade 156 —the aggregate market value of targets increased 
dramatically, both because more bids were being made and because the 
largest targets were bigger than they ever had been.157 Size had formerly 
functioned as a potent obstacle to uninvited bids for control because of 
challenges associated with financing takeovers. 158  As Newsweek told 
readers in 1988, however, “on today’s Wall Street few companies, no matter 
how big or venerable, are off limits.”159  
The new, widespread vulnerability to unwelcome hostile takeovers 
dramatically reoriented priorities in America’s boardrooms. Business Week 
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said in 1985 “[u]ltimately, only a company that sells for something close to 
its full value is safe from a raid.”160 That meant “[c]ompanies are paying 
more attention to shareholders . . . reorganizing their balance sheets, 
repurchasing their shares, and doing all they can to make stock prices reflect 
asset values and cash flows.”161 The Chicago Tribune indicated in 1987 
“[c]ompany managers and directors know that if they don’t boost their stock 
price quickly, someone else armed with debt financing probably will.”162 
Murray Weidenbaum, a business school professor, concurred, saying “[i]f 
the board will not make the difficult choices to enhance the value of the 
corporation, the takeover artists will.”163 The upshot as of 1987, according 
to the CEO and chair of the board of consumer products giant Procter & 
Gamble, was that “[w]idespread hostile takeover activity has made 
maximizing immediate shareholder value appear to be the basic purpose of 
a business enterprise.”164 
Takeover activity declined substantially as soon as the 1980s ended, 
particularly of the hostile variety.165 The temporary collapse of a market for 
“junk bonds” bidders had been relying upon to raise finance, judicial 
endorsements of managerial deployment of takeover defenses, and the 
promulgation of anti-takeover legislation by a substantial majority of states 
all helped to throw the brakes on hostile takeover offers. 166  Alfred 
Rappaport had told Wall Street Journal readers in 1987 “[r]estructuring to 
create shareholder value is not a transitory fad; it will become a permanent 
part of management’s strategic response to shifting economic forces.”167 
However, when the Deal Decade ended abruptly, doubts arose as to what 
would motivate public company executives to focus on generating healthy 
returns for shareholders if they had no reason to fear a hostile takeover. The 
fact that in 1990 the Business Roundtable referred to the responsibility that 
directors had to all stakeholders rather than emphasizing stockholders’ 
interests indicated that shareholder primacy was not yet a fully-entrenched 
norm amongst the managerial elite. 168  Nell Minow, a well-known 
shareholder activist, referred to the Business Roundtable’s stance as “a 
wiring diagram for CEO monarchy” that assumed “American business is 
doing just fine and does not need interference from anyone, especially 
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shareholders.”169 There would only be, however, a brief post-Deal Decade 
pause in the shareholder-friendly momentum. During the 1990s governance 
changes would lock in the generation of shareholder value as the top 
managerial priority. 
Contemporaries were well aware a post-Deal Decade change of heart in 
public companies could displace the recent prioritizing of shareholder 
welfare. In February 1990 the New York Times, having noted that “[m]any 
of the raiders who once struck terror in the hearts of chief executives are on 
the sidelines” and having indicated that the decline in takeover activity was 
allowing “corporate executives to breathe easier,” suggested that “unless 
other catalysts for change emerge . . . corporate America could slack off 
again.”170 The Financial Times said later the same year, “it is generally 
agreed that in the US, fear of takeover is an important (although highly 
capricious) discipline on the self-interested behaviour of managements. 
Who or what can take the place of the takeover market?”171  
The New York Times identified in its 1990 article two examples of “other 
catalysts for change” that could ensure that corporate America would not 
get “fat and lazy,” namely “more aggressive outside directors” and “more 
active institutional shareholders.”172 There was an additional shareholder-
friendly corporate governance mechanism to which the New York Times did 
not draw attention that others were flagging up, namely reconfiguring 
executive pay to strengthen links between managerial compensation and 
shareholder returns. The Los Angeles Times told readers in May 1990 an 
“executive’s pay should be maximized when shareholder value is 
maximized.”173 A Wall Street Journal columnist said the same month that 
if advice academics Michael Jensen and Kevin Murphy were offering in a 
forthcoming Harvard Business Review article that the pay of executives 
should be tied more closely to the fate of their companies’ stock was put 
into practice “[t]he individual companies and the economy would be better 
served.” 174  Amongst these “other catalysts for change” a 1990s 
reconfiguration of executive pay would prove to be the most influential, but 
boards and shareholders both helped to bring that reconfiguration about. 
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With boards, Business Week observed in 1994 that “shareholder wealth 
creation” had “become the mantra of modern management” and explained 
this in part on the basis that in public companies “directors have placed more 
focus than ever on market value.” 175  At the same time, boards were 
becoming “energized,” at least as compared to previous decades.176 Board-
driven executive turnover in the early 1990s at leading companies such as 
Goodyear, Westinghouse, American Express, General Motors, IBM, and 
Kodak seemed to prove directors were putting “the interests of shareholders 
first in their thinking.”177  
As for institutional shareholders, sociologist Charles Derber said in his 
1998 book Corporation Nation that the fact that they had “clearly gained 
some real ground” during the 1990s had brought “shareholder value to the 
lips of every corporate executive.”178 Between the 1950s and the 1980s 
institutional share ownership grew markedly but institutional investors 
largely refrained from intervening in the affairs of public companies in 
which they held shares. 179  As the 1990s got underway it was widely 
assumed the situation was changing, with institutional shareholders 
ostensibly emerging as active monitors of public company executives.180 
The fact that institutional investor lobbying helped to prompt the high-
profile board-driven executive turnover occurring in the early 1990s lent 
credence to this line of thinking and seemed to imply that management 
needed to “[p]roduce consistent shareholder gains on a regular basis or 
something will be done.”181  
There was not as much substance to the 1990s change in approach by 
boards and institutional shareholders as seemed to be the case at the time. 
Various highly publicized-corporate scandals occurring in the early 2000s 
where directors had been unaware of the impending calamity implied that 
1990s boardroom reform may have been largely illusory.182 Indeed, a 2003 
New York Times article published to coincide with the ten-year anniversary 
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of the dismissal of IBM’s CEO entitled “The Revolution That Wasn’t” said 
“10 years later, it looks very much as if the corporate governance revolution 
of 1993 is back at Square 1.”183  
As for institutional shareholders, doubts about their contribution to 
corporate governance were evident well before the end of the 1990s. Law 
professor Jill Fisch cautioned in 1994 “reports of shareholder monitoring 
may be overstated.”184 A 1999 study of the activities of a large sample of 
institutional owners found “[c]ontrary to what prior reports . . . may intimate 
. . . most institutions follow a passive policy.”185 In 2001 law professor 
Douglas Branson said there was “no doubt . . . that that the promise of 
institutional investor activism was the oversold idea of the early 1990s.”186 
While neither boards of directors nor institutional shareholders may have 
pushed shareholder value up the managerial priority list to the degree that 
seemed possible as the 1990s got underway, both did play a significant role 
in transforming executive pay in a manner that contributed to a “shareholder 
first” mentality amongst corporate executives. Alfred Rappaport, the 
shareholder value pioneer, said of directors in the Harvard Business Review 
in 1999: 
In the early 1990s, corporate boards began to highlight shareholder 
value. They became convinced that the surest way to align the 
interests of managers with those of shareholders was to make stock 
options a large component of executive compensation. By the mid-
1990s, CEOs and other senior managers found themselves with 
significant stock and options holdings.187 
Institutional shareholders in their turn did much to prompt the executive 
pay rethink in which 1990s boards engaged. In 1992 Fortune drew attention 
to the fact “[i]nstitutional investors, the wakening 900-pound gorillas of 
corporate life, are turning their attention to CEO pay” and said of a 
shareholder campaign the previous year to force the conglomerate ITT to 
link the pay of its chief executive to the company’s performance “the ugly 
publicity (ITT) endured has probably frightened many others into changing 
their ways.”188 Management professor Michael Useem noted in 1996 that 
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institutional shareholders despised “high compensation levels displaying 
little relationship to company performance” and said for companies that “the 
marching orders from the investment community have been to tighten the 
linkage with shareholder wealth.”189  
The emphasis placed on linking pay with performance had a marked 
impact on the configuration of executive compensation. The proportion of 
CEO pay in large public companies that was equity based (primarily in the 
form of stock options) was 60% in 1999 as compared with 20% in 1990.190 
The shift in turn influenced managerial priorities. The Wall Street Journal 
told readers in 1998 “investors aren’t the only people on the trail of 
shareholder value these days. As companies across the U.S. increasingly tie 
executive compensation to performance through stock options and other 
means, more and more corporate managers are seeking this Holy Grail.”191 
By the 2000s it was widely accepted that changes to executive pay in the 
1990s had “truly focused management’s attention on the stock market’s 
evaluation of their companies.”192 In 2001, economist Robert Shiller said 
that because “[f]irms have tilted their compensation packages for 
management away from fixed salaries toward participation, as investors . . 
. management has an incentive to do everything they can to boost share 
prices.”193 Management professor Gerald Davis concurred, maintaining in 
2009 that “the massive shift in compensation practices” occurring in the 
1990s was “[p]erhaps the most compelling reason for executives’ new-
found religious devotion to shareholder value.”194 
The chronology set out thus far strongly suggests that in relation to the 
prioritization of shareholder value in American public companies Milton 
Friedman’s 1970 New York Times essay played at best a modest supporting 
role. For nearly fifteen years after the essay was published, the shareholder 
primacy norm that would subsequently prevail was conspicuous by its 
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absence.195 When the shift occurred, as we have just seen, it was primarily 
attributable to the shock treatment of hostile takeover bids in the 1980s and 
the reconfiguration of executive pay in the 1990s, supported by boards and 
shareholders aware there needed to be governance substitutes once the 
threat takeovers had posed for underperforming executives faded into the 
background. While the relevant chronology does much to put Friedman’s 
1970 essay into proper context, one additional step is required to round out 
the process. This is contrasting what Friedman said public company 
managers should prioritize with the shareholder-first ethos that would in fact 
dominate as the twentieth century drew to a close. We consider this point 
next.  
V. FRIEDMAN AND SHAREHOLDER VALUE 
A presumption that underlies the notoriety of Milton Friedman’s New 
York Times essay a half-century after publication is that Friedman’s essay 
was the catalyst for the present-day prioritization of shareholder value in 
corporate America.196 In fact, Friedman’s 1970 essay did relatively little to 
presage the nature of the shareholder-first ethos that would subsequently 
take hold. The essay was “only a commonsense and conservative think piece 
on the proper roles of corporations and their managers,”197 not some form 
of blueprint for the form of shareholder primacy that would take hold in 
American boardrooms. There were themes the essay explored that remained 
salient as shareholder value moved to the forefront. Nevertheless, the 
connection was partial at best. 
Supporters of shareholder-centric governance maintain that managerial 
discipline is fortified if profits are the top priority because executive 
performance can be assessed in accordance with a single, comprehensible 
metric.198  Friedman was alive to this logic. He warned that a corporate 
executive who was inclined to use corporate resources to address social 
objectives would be “guided only by general exhortations from on high to 
restrain inflation, improve the environment, fight poverty and so on and 
on.”199  
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Proponents of a shareholder-oriented corporate sector also defend their 
stance by pointing out that executives under an onus to maximize 
shareholder returns will find it difficult to justify self-serving policies by 
citing the need to protect interests of a non-shareholder corporate 
constituency.200 Again, Friedman was on board. He said: “The difficulty of 
exercising ‘social responsibility’ illustrates, of course, the great virtue of 
private competitive enterprise—it forces people to be responsible for their 
own actions and makes it difficult for them to ‘exploit’ other people for 
either selfish or unselfish purposes.”201 
A further point advocates of shareholder primacy have made to justify a 
strong managerial focus on shareholder returns is that everyone associated 
with a corporation should be doing well if the shareholders are. The 
reasoning follows on from the proposition that shareholders are residual 
claimants in a company, in the sense that they are only entitled to receive 
what is left over after accounting for other claims their company is obliged 
to meet.202 With shareholders being residual claimants and with shareholder 
returns being determined by the net cash flow companies generate over 
time, it follows that with regard to corporate constituencies a “rising tide of 
corporate profits will raise all ships.”203  As Jack Welch, who gained a 
reputation for delivering for shareholders while serving as chief executive 
officer of General Electric from 1981 to 2001,204 told Business Week readers 
in 2006, “sustained profitability leads to . . . satisfied customers, engaged 
employees, thriving communities, and healthy societies.”205 
Friedman did not use the term “residual claimant” to refer to 
shareholders in his 1970 essay. Indeed, only a decade later would academic 
commentators begin to deploy this terminology to characterize 
shareholders.206 Nevertheless, Friedman believed that what was good for a 
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corporation’s stockholders should be good for other corporate 
constituencies too. When Friedman assailed corporate expenditures 
designed to achieve “social” objectives he did not focus solely on the 
implications for shareholders. Instead, he was disdainful of “spending the 
stockholders’ or customers’ or employees’ money.”207 Friedman elaborated 
in relation to a corporate executive who was “spending someone else’s 
money for a general social interest,” saying “[i]nsofar as his actions in 
accord with his ‘social responsibility’ reduce returns to stockholders, he is 
spending their money. Insofar as his actions raise the price to customers, he 
is spending the customers’ money. Insofar as his actions lower the wages of 
some employees, he is spending their money.”208 To Friedman, then, all key 
corporate constituencies were in the same boat, at least in the corporate 
social responsibility context. 
While Friedman’s essay no doubt had strong shareholder-friendly 
overtones, key elements of the shareholder-first mentality that would come 
to prevail as the twentieth century drew to a close were missing. Consider 
the nomenclature. While Friedman has been identified as a pioneering 
proponent of shareholder value and shareholder primacy,209 he did not refer 
to either concept. This is hardly surprising, given that these terms were not 
part of the corporate or stock market lexicon at the time. Prior to 1970 the 
term “shareholder value” had only appeared three times in the Wall Street 
Journal, had only been referred to on three occasions in annual reports 
public corporations issued to shareholders, and had only been used once in 
academic publications searchable through the JSTOR digital library.210 As 
for “shareholder primacy,” the term was first deployed in academic journals 
at the end of the 1980s and did not appear in the Wall Street Journal until 
2003.211 
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What Friedman did say in his 1970 essay reinforces the point that his 
article was merely an indirect forerunner of late twentieth century 
shareholder primacy. The essay discussed at length what corporate 
executives should not be doing—spending their corporations’ money in 
accordance with supposed social responsibilities. In contrast, very little was 
said about what management should affirmatively seek to achieve, whether 
with respect to shareholders or otherwise. Friedman, for instance, never 
used the word “maximize” in his essay. While Friedman did suggest a 
corporate executive’s responsibility was “to make as much money as 
possible,” he qualified this by saying managers should act in accordance 
with society’s basic rules as embodied in law and ethical custom.212 Also, 
while the title of Friedman’s essay indicated a business should “increase its 
profits,” the point was only taken up once in the main body of the article, 
namely when Friedman quoted a passage from the discussion of corporate 
social responsibility in his 1962 book Capitalism and Freedom.213 Friedman 
did assert in that book that corporate executives had no “responsibility other 
than to make as much money for their stockholders as possible,”214 which is 
a sentiment akin to maximizing shareholder returns. There is no such 
invocation in his New York Times essay.215 
Another indication that Friedman’s essay was substantially removed 
from the shareholder-friendly mentality that emerged during the 1980s and 
prevailed thereafter was that the essay failed to foreshadow in any way a 
crucial element of that ethos. What the New York Times referred to in 2002 
as an “earnings cult” would become a hallmark of the shareholder 
orientation that emerged in public companies as the twentieth century drew 
to a close.216 Friedman said nothing about this.  
In 2005 John Bogle, founder of the Vanguard mutual fund group, said of 
corporate America that its “[e]xecutives don’t need to be told what to do: 
achieve strong, steady earnings growth and tell Wall Street about it.”217 As 
fascination with earnings results companies divulged quarterly grew in the 
1980s, executives played ball due to apprehension about a possible hostile 
takeover.218 Harold Williams, former chair of the SEC, explained why in 
1985: “Corporations become vulnerable if their stock prices flag, and 
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managers believe that stock prices flag if quarterly earnings dip or just stay 
flat. Managers therefore struggle to keep earnings on an uptrend lest they be 
remembered as the ones who ‘lost’ General Widget.”219  
While hostile takeovers receded into the corporate governance 
background in the 1990s,220 quarterly financial results were on their way to 
becoming an “obsession.”221 A powerful norm was taking hold—public 
companies should meet or exceed estimates of forthcoming quarterly 
earnings.222 If a company came up short, this could “kill a stock.”223 Public 
company executives in turn had strong incentives to respond to the 
investment community’s fixation on quarterly earnings data. With high 
profile instances of board-driven managerial turnover occurring in the early 
1990s remaining fresh in the memory, executives knew a sharp stock price 
decline might compel their board to put managerial turnover on the 
agenda.224 Moreover, the compensation bonanza liberal granting of stock 
options potentially foretold for management became considerably less 
likely as a company’s share price fell. As Business Week said in 1998 of 
public company executives whose companies failed to meet earnings 
projections, “the resulting pain is intensely personal, since more than half 
of CEO pay comes from stock options.”225  
If Friedman’s 1970 essay truly was a direct forerunner of the shareholder 
first mentality that took hold as the twentieth century drew to a close, it 
might have been expected that he would have urged corporate executives to 
set and hit earnings targets. In fact, he was silent on this point. History 
reveals why. It was only during the 1970s that stock market followers began 
to collate investor analysts’ estimates of forthcoming quarterly earnings 
data for particular companies and only during the 1980s that investors began 
using quarterly earnings projections with regularity to assess corporate 
prospects and managerial competence.226  
Similarly, given the supposedly influential status of Friedman’s essay 
and given corporate America’s subsequent stock market obsession it might 
have been anticipated that Friedman would have had a lot to say about 
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shareholder returns. Again, no. The only time that Friedman mentioned 
share prices in his essay was to make the point that actions an executive 
took in the name of social responsibility that depressed a corporation's 
profits would reduce the price of its stock.227 Hence, while the shareholder 
value ethos that ultimately flourished in public companies “offered little by 
way of nuance,” as the Economist suggested in a 2019 essay on corporate 
purpose, “Friedman’s position had a fair amount of give in it” even if it was 
“subsequently traduced as extreme.” 228  Friedman’s 1970 essay thus 
belonged “to a simpler time” 229 and had little directly to say about the 
shareholder-first mentality that would subsequently take hold in America’s 
public companies. 
CONCLUSION 
Bill Shaw, an expert on business ethics, wrote in 1988 in a reply to an 
article criticizing Milton Friedman’s 1970 New York Times essay on 
corporate social responsibility, “[L]et go of Milton Friedman. He has made 
an important contribution and that is more than most have done. Beyond 
that, he has set the tone for the Corporate Social Responsibility debate for 
too long.”230 This invocation fell on deaf ears. More than three decades after 
Shaw made his “let go” plea, Friedman’s 1970 essay is thought of as the 
classic statement of shareholder-oriented capitalism and as such is a primary 
target for critics of this approach. Now, however, it truly is time to let go 
and stop blaming Friedman for the shareholder orientation of American 
public companies.  
The attention Milton Friedman’s 1970 essay continues to attract would 
be justified if his essay had been a plea for maximization of shareholder 
returns that constituted a sharp break from the past that put prevailing 
wisdom under immediate threat. None of those conditions are fulfilled. The 
essay was not a fundamental departure from conventional wisdom; it had 
often been said prior to 1970 that companies should focus on the bottom 
line. It is true that when Friedman wrote that public company executives 
were under unprecedented pressure to think of the corporate mission 
broadly. Friedman’s essay did little, however, to reverse this trend. Instead, 
the need for a balanced multi-constituency approach was widely accepted 
in American boardrooms for at least a dozen years after his New York Times 
essay was published. Finally, the obsessive focus on earnings trends and 
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share prices that would emerge as the twentieth century drew to a close was 
nowhere to be found in Friedman’s essay. 
Many of Friedman’s present-day critics likely are not particularly 
interested in what he actually said in 1970.231 What troubles them is what 
has been described as “the extraordinary power of shareholder-centrism as 
a dominant norm in corporate governance.”232 Sights are set on Friedman’s 
New York Times essay because it is assumed to have been the well-spring 
for the invidious shareholder-oriented mentality that would ultimately 
prevail in public companies. That reductionist assumption, as this Article 
has shown, is erroneous. Friedman was covering familiar ground when he 
indicated profits were important, his essay failed to displace the 
stakeholder-friendly norms that would prevail in corporate America through 
the mid-1980s, and the essay said little about what executives should be 
seeking to achieve with respect to share prices or otherwise.  
As the Business Roundtable’s promulgation of its stakeholder-friendly 
2019 “Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation” indicates, those uneasy 
with the shareholder orientation that has prevailed in corporate America 
since the 1980s have recently been gaining ground in the “Great Debate” 
about what companies are for. 233 Indeed, a Wall Street Journal columnist 
has suggested stakeholder capitalism “has steadily become the dominant 
philosophy among Western business elites.”234 It is far from clear, however, 
that a major shift in priorities beckons in the American public company.235 
As a New York Times columnist said in 2019, “because a public 
corporation’s most direct incentives — including the CEO’s pay — remain 
tied to stock performance, there’s no reason to believe that corporations will 
voluntarily move away from pleasing shareholders alone, despite the new, 
high-minded ideals.”236 To succeed in upending the dominant narrative in 
corporate America shareholder primacy’s critics would be better served 
trying to change minds about the incentives of present-day corporate 
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executives than assailing a half-century old essay substantially removed 
from today’s concerns.  
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